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ASYMMETRIC EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
ALEX MCAVOY AND CHRISTOPH HAUERT
Abstract. Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of in-
teracting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric,
which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic
interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline
characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into
evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecological and genotypic. Ecolog-
ical asymmetry results from variation in the environments of the players, while genotypic asymmetry is a
consequence of the players having differing baseline genotypes. We develop a theory of these forms of asym-
metry for games in structured populations and use the classical social dilemmas, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
the Snowdrift Game, for illustrations. Interestingly, asymmetric games reveal essential differences between
models of genetic evolution based on reproduction and models of cultural evolution based on imitation that
are not apparent in symmetric games.
1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory has been used extensively to study the evolution of cooperation in social
dilemmas (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Nowak, 2006a; Taylor et al., 2007). A social dilemma is typically modeled
as a game with two strategies, cooperate (C) and defect (D), whose payoffs for pairwise interactions are
defined by a matrix of the form
( C D
C R,R S, T
D T, S P, P
)
(1)
(Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). For a focal player using a strategy on the left-hand
side of this matrix against an opponent using a strategy on the top of the matrix, the first (resp. second)
coordinate of the corresponding entry of this matrix is the payoff to the focal player (resp. opponent). That
is, a cooperator receives R when facing another cooperator and S when facing a defector; a defector receives
T when facing a cooperator and P when facing another defector. Since the same argument applies to the
opponent, the game defined by (1) is symmetric. If defection pays more than cooperation when the opponent
is a cooperator (T > R), but the payoff for mutual cooperation is greater than the payoff for mutual defection
(R > P ), then a social dilemma (Dawes, 1980; Hauert et al., 2006) arises from this game due to the conflict
of interest between the individual and the group (or pair). The nature of this social dilemma depends on the
ordering of R, S, T , and P . Biologically, the most important rankings are given by the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(T > R > P > S) and the Snowdrift Game (T > R > S > P ) (Maynard Smith, 1982; Hauert and Doebeli,
2004; Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; Hauert et al., 2006; Voelkl, 2010).
Since matrix (1) defines a symmetric game, any two players using the same strategy are indistinguish-
able for the purpose of calculating payoffs. In nature, however, asymmetry frequently arises in interspecies
interactions such as parasitic or symbiotic relationships (Maynard Smith, 1982). Interactions between sub-
populations, such as in Dawkins’ Battle of the Sexes Game (Dawkins, 1976; Schuster and Sigmund, 1981;
Maynard Smith and Hofbauer, 1987; Hofbauer, 1996), also give rise to asymmetry that cannot be modeled
by the symmetric matrix (1). Even intraspecies interactions are essentially always asymmetric: (i) pheno-
typic variations such as size, strength, speed, wealth, or intellectual capabilities; (ii) differences in access to
and availability of environmental resources; or (iii) each individual’s history of past interactions, all affect the
interacting individuals differently and result in asymmetric payoffs. The winner-loser effect, for example, is a
well-studied example of effects of previous encounters on future interactions and has been reported across taxa
(Dugatkin, 1997; Maynard Smith, 1982), including even mollusks (Wright and Shanks, 1993; Shanks, 2002).
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Asymmetry may also result from the assignment of social roles (Selten, 1980; Hammerstein, 1981; Ohtsuki,
2010), such as the roles of “parent” and “offspring” (Marshall, 2009): cooperation may be tied to individual
energy or strength, for example, which is, in turn, determined by a player’s role. In the realm of continuous
strategies, adaptive dynamics has been used to study asymmetric competition, which applies to the resource
consumption of plants, for instance (Weiner, 1990; Freckleton and Watkinson, 2001; Doebeli and Ispolatov,
2012). In social dilemmas containing many cooperators, accumulated benefits may be synergistically en-
hanced (or discounted) in a way that depends on who or where the players are (Hauert et al., 2006), thereby
making larger group interactions asymmetric. To model such interactions using evolutionary game theory,
the payoff matrix must reflect the asymmetry.
In the Donation Game, a cooperator pays a cost, c, to deliver a benefit, b, to the opponent, while a
defector pays no cost and provides no benefit (Sigmund, 2010). In terms of matrix (1), this game satisfies
R = b − c, S = −c, T = b, and P = 0. Provided b and c are positive, mutual defection is the only Nash
equilibrium. If b > c, then this game defines a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Perhaps the simplest way to modify
this game to account for possible sources of asymmetry is to allow for each pair of players to have a distinct
payoff matrix; that is, the payoff matrix for player i against player j in the Donation Game is
Mij :=
( C D
C bj − ci, bi − cj −ci, bi
D bj , −cj 0, 0
)
(2)
for some bi, bj , ci, and cj . If player i cooperates, then this player donates bi to his or her opponent and
incurs a cost of ci for doing so. As before, defectors provide no benefit and pay no cost. The index i could
refer to a baseline trait of the player, the player’s location, his or her history of past interactions, motivation
(Bergman et al., 2010), or any other non-strategy characteristic that distinguishes one player from another.
Games based on matrices of the form (2), with payoffs for both players in each entry of the matrix, are
sometimes called bimatrix games. Although bimatrix games have appeared in the context of evolution-
ary dynamics (Hofbauer, 1996; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003; Ohtsuki, 2010), most of the focus on these
games has been in the setting of classical game theory and economics (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991)
where “matrix game” generally means “bimatrix game.” Bimatrix games may be used to model classical
asymmetric interactions such as those arising from sexual asymmetry in the Battle of the Sexes Game
(Magurran and Nowak, 1991). The asymmetric, four-strategy Hawk-Dove Game of (Maynard Smith, 1982)
consisting of the strategies Hawk, Dove, Bourgeois, and anti-Bourgeois may also be framed as a (4 × 4)
bimatrix game (see Mesterton-Gibbons, 1992). Symmetric matrix games, such as (1), are special cases of
bimatrix games. We explore here the ways in which bimatrix games can be incorporated into evolutionary
dynamics and used to model natural asymmetries in biological populations.
We treat two particular forms of asymmetry: ecological and genotypic. Ecological asymmetry is derived
from the locations of the players, whereas genotypic asymmetry is based on the players themselves. With
ecological asymmetry,Mij is the payoff matrix for a player at location i against a player at location j. Since
the payoffs depend on the locations of the players, this form of asymmetry requires a structured population.
Ecological asymmetry is a natural consideration in evolutionary dynamics since it ties strategy success to
the environment. In the Donation Game, for instance, cooperators might be donating goods or services, but
the costs and benefits may depend on the environmental conditions, i.e. the location of the donor.
On the other hand, players might instead differ in ability or strength, and “strong” cooperators might
contribute greater benefits (or incur lower costs) than “weak” cooperators. This variation results in genotypic
asymmetry, where each player has a baseline genotype (strength) and a strategy (C or D). This form of
asymmetry turns out to be subtler than it seems at first glance, however, since genotypes are generally
represented by strategies in evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982; Dugatkin, 2000). In particular,
it might seem that the genotype and strategy of a player could be combined into a single composite strategy
and that the symmetric game based on these composite strategies could replace the original asymmetric
game. As it happens, whether genotypic asymmetry can be resolved by a symmetric game depends on the
details of the evolutionary process.
Classically, evolutionary games were studied in infinite populations via replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker,
1978), and more recently these games have been considered in finite populations (Nowak et al., 2004;
Taylor et al., 2004). Because every biological population is finite, we focus on finite populations (which,
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for technical reasons, we assume to be large). Since ecological asymmetry requires distinguishing different
locations within the population, we assume that the population is structured and that a network defines the
structure. Network-structured populations have received a considerable amount of attention in evolution-
ary game theory and provide a natural setting in which to study social dilemmas (Lieberman et al., 2005;
Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006; Taylor et al., 2007; Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007; De´barre et al.,
2014). Compared to well-mixed populations, in which each player interacts with every other player, networks
can restrict the interactions that occur within the population by specifying which players are “neighbors,”
i.e. share a link. We represent the links among the N players in the population using an adjacency matrix,
(wij)16i,j6N , which is defined by letting wij = 1 if there is a link from vertex i to vertex j and 0 otherwise
(and satisfies wij = wji for each i and j).
In an evolutionary game, the state of a population of players is defined by specifying the strategy of each
player. Each player interacts with all of his or her neighbors. The total payoff to a player is multiplied by
a selection intensity, β > 0, and then converted into fitness (see Methods). Once each player is assigned a
fitness, an update rule is used to determine the state of the population at the next time step (Nowak, 2006b).
For example, with a birth-death update rule, a player is chosen from the population for reproduction with
probability proportional to relative fitness. A neighbor of the reproducing player is then randomly chosen
for death, and the offspring, who inherits the strategy of the parent, fills the vacancy. This process is a
modification of the Moran process (Moran, 1958), adapted to allow for (i) frequency-dependent fitnesses and
(ii) population structures that are not necessarily well-mixed. The order of birth and death could also be
reversed to get a death-birth update rule (Ohtsuki et al., 2006). In this rule, death occurs at random and
the neighbors of the deceased compete to reproduce in order to fill the vacancy. These two rules result in
the update of a single strategy in each time step, but one could consider other rules, such as Wright-Fisher
updating, in which all of the strategies are revised in each generation (Imhof and Nowak, 2006). The rules
mentioned to this point define strategy updates via reproduction and inheritance; as such, we refer to them
as genetic update rules.
Another popular class of update rules is based on revisions to the existing players’ strategy choices.
We refer to rules falling into this class as cultural update rules. Examples include imitation updating, in
which a player is selected at random to evaluate his or her strategy and then probabilistically compares this
strategy to those of his or her neighbors (Ohtsuki et al., 2006). A more localized version of this update rule
is known as pairwise comparison updating, in which a player chooses a random neighbor for comparison
rather than looking at the entire neighborhood (Szabo´ and To˝ke, 1998; Traulsen et al., 2007). Under best
response dynamics, an individual adopts the strategy that performs best given the current strategies of his
or her neighbors (Ellison, 1993). In each of these cultural processes, the strategy of a player can change, but
the underlying genotype is always the same, which suggests that baseline genotype and strategy need to be
treated separately.
Genotypic asymmetry needs to be handled more carefully if the update rule is genetic since the nature of
genotype transmission affects the dynamics of the process. In contrast to cultural processes, the genotype
and strategy of a player at a given location may both change if the update rule is genetic: genotype may
be inherited but not imitated. We will see that this property results in cultural and genetic processes
behaving completely differently in the presence of genotypic asymmetry. Phenotype may have both genetic
and environmental components (Mahner and Kary, 1997; Baye et al., 2011), and after treating the genetic
(genotypic) and environmental components separately, these two forms of asymmetry may be combined in
order to get a model in which the asymmetry is derived from varying baseline phenotypes. Thus, with
a theory of both ecological asymmetry and genotypic asymmetry based on inherited genotypes, one can
account for more complicated forms of asymmetry appearing in biological populations.
2. Results
2.1. Ecological asymmetry. Here we develop a framework for ecologically asymmetric games in which the
payoffs depend on the locations of the players as well as their strategies. We assume that all of the players
have the same set of strategies (or “actions”) available to them, {A1, . . . , An}. The payoff matrix for a player
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at vertex i against a player at vertex j is
Mij =

A1 A2 · · · An
A1 a
ij
11, a
ji
11 a
ij
12, a
ji
21 · · · a
ij
1n, a
ji
n1
A2 a
ij
21, a
ji
12 a
ij
22, a
ji
22 · · · a
ij
2n, a
ji
n2
...
...
...
. . .
...
An a
ij
n1, a
ji
1n a
ij
n2, a
ji
2n · · · a
ij
nn, a
ji
nn
. (3)
That is, a player at vertex i using strategy Ar against an opponent at vertex j using strategy As realizes a
payoff of aijrs, whereas his opponent receives a
ji
sr. Since a
ij
rs depends on i and j, these payoff matrices capture
the asymmetry of the game.
In the simpler setting of symmetric games, the pair approximation method has been used successfully
to describe the dynamics of evolutionary processes on networks (Matsuda et al., 1992; Bolloba´s, 2001;
Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Vukov et al., 2006; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006). For each r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, this method
approximates the frequency of strategy Ar, which we denote by pr, using the frequencies of strategy pairs in
the population. Pair approximation is expected to be accurate on large random regular networks (Bolloba´s,
2001; Ohtsuki et al., 2006), so we assume that the network is regular (of degree k > 2) and that N is suf-
ficiently large. (For k = 2, the network is just a cycle, which we do not treat here.) We also take β ≪ 1,
meaning that selection is weak, which results in a separation of timescales: the local configurations equi-
librate quickly, while the global strategy frequencies change much more slowly. This separation allows us
to get an explicit expression for the expected change, E [∆pr], in the frequency of strategy Ar for each r.
Incidentally, weak selection happens to be quite reasonable from a biological perspective since each trait is
expected to have only a small effect on the overall fitness of a player (Wu et al., 2010; Tarnita et al., 2011;
Wu et al., 2013).
Interestingly, for two genetic and two cultural update rules, weak selection reduces ecological asymmetry
to a symmetric game derived from the spatial average of the payoff matrices:
Theorem 1. In the limit of weak selection, the dynamics of the ecologically asymmetric death-birth, birth-
death, imitation, and pairwise comparison processes on a large, regular network may be approximated by
the dynamics of a symmetric game with the same update rule and payoff matrix M := 1
kN
∑N
i,j=1 wijM
ij ,
i.e.
M =

A1 A2 · · · An
A1 a11, a11 a12, a21 · · · a1n, an1
A2 a21, a12 a22, a22 · · · a2n, an2
...
...
...
. . .
...
An an1, a1n an2, a2n · · · ann, ann
, (4)
where ast :=
1
kN
∑N
i,j=1 wija
ij
st for each s and t.
For a proof of Theorem 1, see Methods. In Methods, we derive explicit formulas for E [∆pr] for each r
(where pr is the frequency of strategy Ar and E [∆pr] is the expected change in pr in one step of the process)
and show that these expectations depend on M in the limit of weak selection. If we choose an appropriate
time scale and make the approximation
p˙r :=
dpr
dt
=
E [∆pr]
∆t
, (5)
then the dynamics of an ecologically asymmetric process may also be described in terms of the replicator
equation (on graphs) of Ohtsuki and Nowak (2006): If φ :=
∑n
s,t=1 psptast, then
p˙r = pr
(
n∑
s=1
ps
(
ars + brs
)
− φ
)
, (6)
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where brs is a function of M, k, and the update rule. (For each of the four processes, the explicit expression
for brs is provided in Methods.) The matrix
(
brs
)n
r,s=1
accounts for local competition resulting from the
population structure (see Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006). In particular, the Ohtsuki-Nowak transform,
(ars)
n
r,s=1 −→
(
ars + brs
)n
r,s=1
, (7)
which transforms the classical replicator equation into the replicator equation on graphs, also applies to
evolutionary games with ecological asymmetry.
Even though interactions are now governed by a symmetric game, Theorem 1 states that, in general,
the dynamics depend on the particular network configuration, (wij)16i,j6N ; that is, the symmetric payoffs
defined byM still depend on the network structure, or, equivalently, on the distribution of ecological resources
within the population. However, somewhat surprisingly, there is a broad class of games for which this
dependence vanishes:
Definition 1. If aijrs = x
i
rs + y
j
rs for each r and s, then M
ij is called a spatially additive payoff matrix. If
Mij is spatially additive for each i and j, then the game is said to be spatially additive.
A game is spatially additive if the payoff for an interaction between any two members of the population can
be decomposed as a sum of two components, one from each player’s location. Note that spatial additivity is
different from the “equal gains from switching” property (Nowak and Sigmund, 1990) in that neither implies
the other. However, spatial additivity is an analogue in the following sense: if two players at different
locations use the same strategy against a common opponent, then the difference in these two players’ payoffs
for this interaction is independent of the location of the opponent. Interchanging “location” and “strategy,”
one obtains the equal gains from switching property. The importance of spatially additive games is due to
the following corollary to Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. If Mij is spatially additive for each i and j, then the expected change in the frequency of
strategy Ar, E [∆pr], is independent of (wij)16i,j6N for each r. In particular, the dynamics of the process
do not depend on the particular network configuration.
As an example, the asymmetric Donation Game is spatially additive and possesses the equal gains from
switching property, which greatly simplifies the analysis of its dynamics:
Example 1 (Donation Game with ecological asymmetry). The asymmetric Donation Game with payoff
matrices defined by Eq. (2) is spatially additive and satisfies
M =
( C D
C b− c, b− c −c, b
D b, −c 0, 0
)
, (8)
where b = 1
N
∑N
i=1 bi and c =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ci. Therefore, the dynamics of the asymmetric game are the same
as those of its symmetric counterpart with benefit, b, and cost, c, regardless of network configuration or
resource distribution. Under death-birth (resp. imitation) updating, this result implies that cooperation
is expected to increase if and only if b/c > k (resp. b/c > k + 2), where k is the degree of the (regular)
network (Ohtsuki et al., 2006). Fig. 1(A) compares the predicted result obtained fromM to simulation data
for imitation updating when benefit and cost values are distributed according to Gaussian random variables.
Example 2 (Snowdrift Game with ecological asymmetry). In order to illustrate when Corollary 1 fails, we
turn to cooperation in the Snowdrift Game (Hauert and Doebeli, 2004; Doebeli and Hauert, 2005). In this
game, two drivers find themselves on either side of a snowdrift. If both cooperate in clearing the snowdrift,
they share the cost, c, equally, and both receive the benefit of being able to pass, b. If one player cooperates
and the other defects, both players receive b but the cooperator pays the full cost, c. If both players defect,
each receives no benefit and pays no cost. In order to incorporate ecological asymmetry, we assume that the
benefits are all the same since they are derived from being able to pass in the absence of a snowdrift. On the
other hand, the cost a player pays to clear the snowdrift may depend on his or her location: the snowdrift
may appear on an incline, for example, in which case one player shovels with the gradient and the other
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player against it. Moreover, when two cooperators meet, they might clear unequal shares of the snowdrift.
Thus, the payoff matrix for a player at location i against a player at location j should be of the form
Mij (αij) :=
( C D
C b− αijci, b− αjicj b− ci, b
D b, b− cj 0, 0
)
, (9)
where 0 6 αij 6 1 and αij + αji = 1 (Du et al., 2009). Intuitively, when two cooperators face one other,
they each begin to clear the snowdrift and stop once they meet; the quantity αij indicates the fraction of
the snowdrift a cooperator at location i clears before meeting the cooperator at location j. A natural choice
for αij is
αij =
cj
ci + cj
, (10)
which is the unique value that gives αijci = αjicj for each i and j, ensuring that the game is fair, i.e. that
the cooperator with the higher cost clears a smaller portion of the snowdrift than the one with the lower
cost. Averaging the payoff to one cooperator against another over all possible locations gives
1
kN
N∑
i,j=1
wij (b − αijci) = b−
1
kN
N∑
i,j=1
wij
(
cicj
ci + cj
)
, (11)
which is the upper-left entry of M. In contrast, the remaining three entries of M do not depend on
(wij)16i,j6N . Therefore, provided there are at least two locations with distinct cost values, the dynam-
ics of an evolutionary process depend on the particular network configuration (Theorem 1). This network
dependence is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Suppose now that we set αij ≡ 1/2 to model ecological asymmetry in the Snowdrift Game; that is, if
two cooperators meet, they each clear exactly half of the snowdrift. If there are two cost values in the
population, c1 and c2, with c1 < b < c2 < 2b, then a player who incurs a cost of c1 finds it beneficial to
cooperate against a defector, but a player who incurs a cost of c2 would rather defect in this situation.
Thus, based on the social dilemma implied by the ranking of the payoffs, a player who incurs a cost of c1
for cooperating is always playing a Snowdrift Game while a player who incurs a cost of c2 is always playing
a Prisoner’s Dilemma. It follows that ecological asymmetry can account for multiple social dilemmas being
played within a single population, even if the players all use the same set of strategies (C and D). The payoff
matrices of this particular game are spatially additive, so, by Corollary 1, the dynamics do not depend on
the network configuration. If q is the fraction of vertices with cost value c1 then c = qc1 + (1− q) c2 is the
average cost of cooperation for a particular location and the dynamics are the same as those of the symmetric
Snowdrift Game in which the cost of clearing a snowdrift is c (see Fig. 1(B)). Fig. 3 demonstrates that this
result does not extend to stronger selection strengths, so Theorem 1 is unique to weak selection.
Based on Theorem 1 and the relative rank of payoffs, the social dilemma defined by the asymmetric
game (9) (for general αij) is a Prisoner’s Dilemma if b < c and a Snowdrift Game if b > c when selection
is weak. That is, microscopically, there is a mixture of Prisoner’s Dilemmas and Snowdrift Games, but,
macroscopically, the process behaves like just one of these social dilemmas. Consequently, although the
dynamics of this evolutionary process may depend on the network configuration, the type of social dilemma
implied by this game does not.
2.2. Genotypic asymmetry. Another form of asymmetry is based on the genotypes of the players rather
than their locations. Each player in the population has one of ℓ possible genotypes, and these genotypes are
enumerated by the set {1, . . . , ℓ}. For an n-strategy game, the payoff matrix for a player whose genotype is
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(B)
c1 = 34/13
c2 = 70/13
half c1 / half c2
predicted
Figure 1. Average change in the frequency of cooperators, ∆pC , as a function of the
frequency of cooperators, pC , in (A) an asymmetric Donation Game and (B) asymmetric
Snowdrift Games. The update rules are (A) imitation and (B) death-birth, and each process
has for a selection intensity β = 0.01. In both figures, the network is a random regular graph
of size N = 500 and degree k = 3. In (A), benefits and costs of cooperation vary across
vertices according to a Gaussian distribution with mean 3.5, variance 1.0 for benefits and
mean 0.5, variance 0.25 for costs. In (B), the benefit is b = 5.0 for all vertices, and the costs
are either low, c1 = 34/13, or high c2 = 70/13, which actually recovers the payoff ranking
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma because c2 > b. The costs are the same for all vertices (c1, blue
and c2, green) or mixed at equal proportions (red). (B) confirms that the average change
in cooperators in the mixed Snowdrift Game/Prisoner’s Dilemma (red) may be obtained by
averaging these changes for the Snowdrift Game (blue) and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (green).
The small, systematic deviations between simulation data and analytical predictions (solid
lines) are explained in Methods (where it is also shown that ∆pC is linear in β for β ≪ 1).
u against a player whose genotype is v is
Muv :=

A1 A2 · · · An
A1 a
uv
11 , a
vu
11 a
uv
12 , a
vu
21 · · · a
uv
1n, a
vu
n1
A2 a
uv
21 , a
vu
12 a
uv
22 , a
vu
22 · · · a
uv
2n, a
vu
n2
...
...
...
. . .
...
An a
uv
n1, a
vu
1n a
uv
n2, a
vu
2n · · · a
uv
nn, a
vu
nn
. (12)
We explore genotypic asymmetry for cultural and genetic processes separately:
2.2.1. Cultural updating. If genotypic asymmetry is incorporated into a cultural process, then the genotypes
of the players never change; only the strategies of the players are updated. In a structured population, it
follows that each player’s genotype may be associated with his or her location, and this association is an
invariant of the process. Thus, if u (i) denotes the genotype of the player at location i, then we may apply
Theorem 1 to the matrices defined by Mij =Mu(i)u(j) for each i and j. In this sense, genotypic asymmetry
may be “reduced” to ecological asymmetry in evolutionary games with cultural update rules. Note that,
unlike ecological asymmetry, genotypic asymmetry does not require a structured population. However, one
can always think of a population as structured (even in the well-mixed case), and doing so allows one to
make sense of the “locations” of the players and to apply Theorem 1 to cultural processes with genotypic
asymmetry.
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pC
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
∆
p
C
×10 -4
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Figure 2. Average change in the frequency of cooperators, ∆pC , as a function of the
frequency of cooperators, pC , for a spatially non-additive Snowdrift Game, Eq. (9), with
selection intensity β = 0.01. The blue and green data are obtained using pairwise comparison
updating and differ only in the configuration of the underlying network, which in both cases
is a random regular graph of size N = 500 and degree k = 3. Every vertex has a benefit value
of b = 4.0, and the cost values are split equally, with half of the vertices having c1 = 0.5 and
the remaining half having c2 = 5.5. The average payoff for mutual cooperation, Eq. (11),
is 3.069 (blue) and 2.961 (green), which suggests that the former arrangement is more
attractive for cooperation. The analytical predictions (solid lines) are obtained from Eq.
(48) in Methods (and are linear in β for β ≪ 1).
pC
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
∆
p
C
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-0.02
-0.01
0
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0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
(A)
c1 = 34/13
c2 = 70/13
half c1 / half c2
average of • and •
predicted
pC
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
∆
p
C
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
(B)
c1 = 34/13
c2 = 70/13
half c1 / half c2
average of • and •
Figure 3. The Snowdrift Games of Fig. 1(B) with the stronger selection strengths β = 0.1
(A) and β = 0.5 (B). For each of the three games (with benefit b = 5.0 and costs c1, c2,
and half c1/half c2, respectively), the simulation results differ from the prediction of pair
approximation already for β = 0.1 (A). Moreover, for β = 0.5, (B) makes it clear that
Theorem 1 no longer holds since the average change in cooperators in the game with mixed
costs (red) differs from the average (grey) of these changes for the games with costs c1 only
(blue) and c2 only (green). Thus, Theorem 1 is peculiar to weak selection.
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Example 3 (Donation Game with genotypic asymmetry and cultural updating). In the Donation Game,
a cooperator of genotype u donates bu at a cost of cu. Defectors contribute no benefit and pay no cost,
irrespective of genotype. Consider imitation updating on a large, regular network of degree k, and let u (i)
denote the genotype of the player at location i (henceforth “player i”). Suppose that player i is a cooperator,
player j is a defector, and that player i imitates player j and becomes a cooperator. Despite this strategy
change, the genotype of player i is still u (i), and the payoff matrix for player i against player j is still
Mu(i)u(j). On the other hand, consider the same process but with the genotypic asymmetry replaced by
ecological asymmetry (and withMij :=Mu(i)u(j) as the payoff matrix for the player at location i against the
player at location j). Since the genotype of a player at a given location never changes in an imitation process,
the process with ecological asymmetry is well-defined; that is, Mij is independent of the dynamics of the
process for each i and j. Therefore, we may instead study the evolution of cooperation in the process with
ecological asymmetry, and we already know from Example 1 that, in the limit of weak selection, the frequency
of cooperators in this Donation Game is expected to increase if and only if (k + 2)
∑N
i=1 cu(i) <
∑N
i=1 bu(i).
In contrast, for genetic update rules, the asymmetry present due to differing genotypes can be removed
completely if the genotypes of offspring are determined by genetic inheritance:
2.2.2. Genetic updating. Genetic update rules are defined by the ability of players to propagate their offspring
to other locations in the population by means of births and deaths. In other words, there is a reproductive
step in which genetic information is passed from parent(s) to child. Both the death-birth and birth-death
processes have genetic update rules, but reproduction need not be clonal for the update rule to be genetic.
If the genotypes of offspring are determined by genetic inheritance, then the strategy and genotype at each
location are updated simultaneously: if the offspring of a player whose genotype is u and whose strategy is
Ar replaces a player whose genotype is v and whose strategy is As, then v is updated to u and As is updated
to Ar synchronously. Therefore, rather than treating genotypes and strategies separately, we may consider
them together in the form of pairs, (u,Ar), linking genotype and strategy. These pairs may be thought of
as composite strategies of a larger evolutionary game whose payoff matrix, M˜, is defined by
M˜(u,Ar),(v,As) := a
uv
rs (13)
for genotypes, u and v, and strategies, Ar and As. The map{
Muv
}ℓ
u,v=1
−→ M˜ (14)
resolves a collection of n × n asymmetric payoff matrices with a single symmetric payoff matrix, M˜, of
size ℓn × ℓn. This argument holds for any population structure, so evolutionary processes with genotypic
asymmetry that are based on genetic update rules can be studied in any setting in which there is a theory of
symmetric games. For example, we may use the results from pair approximation on large, regular networks
to study the Donation Game with genotypic asymmetry and genetic updating:
Example 4 (Donation Game with genotypic asymmetry and genetic updating). As in Example 3, a coop-
erator of genotype u in the Donation Game donates bu at a cost of cu. Defectors contribute no benefit and
pay no cost, irrespective of genotype. For the death-birth and birth-death update rules, defectors may be
modeled as cooperators whose benefit and costs are both 0. In the larger symmetric game defined by (14),
it follows that there are ℓ + 1 distinct composite strategies: (1, C), (2, C), . . . , (ℓ, C), and D := (ℓ+ 1, C).
For death-birth updating on a large, regular network of degree k, cooperators of genotype u ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} are
expected to increase if and only if
k
(
cu −
ℓ∑
v=1
cvpv
)
< bu −
ℓ∑
v=1
bvpv, (15)
where, for each v ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, pv denotes the frequency of cooperators of genotype v (i.e. the frequency of
strategy (v, C) in the larger symmetric game). The terms
∑ℓ
v=1 bvpv and
∑ℓ
v=1 cvpv are the average popu-
lation benefit and cost values, respectively. Therefore, the condition for the expected increase in cooperators
of a particular genotype depends on the average level of cooperation within the population. Eq. (15) may
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be thought of as an analogue of the ‘b/c > k’ rule of Ohtsuki et al. (2006) with b replaced by the “benefit
premium,” bu −
∑ℓ
v=1 bvpv, and c replaced by the “cost premium,” cu −
∑ℓ
v=1 cvpv.
In the birth-death process, on the other hand, cooperators of genotype u ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} are expected to
increase if and only if
cu <
ℓ∑
v=1
cvpv. (16)
Interestingly, this condition is independent of the benefit values and says that cooperators of genotype
u ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} increase in abundance if they incur, on average, smaller costs for cooperating than the other
cooperators.
Eqs. (15) and (16) are obtained by noticing that the expected change in the frequency of cooperators of
genotype u, E [∆pu], is a positive multiple of bu−
∑ℓ
v=1 bvpv−k
(
cu −
∑ℓ
v=1 cvpv
)
in the death-birth process
and of
∑ℓ
v=1 cvpv − cu in the birth-death process (see Eqs. (33) and (36) in Methods). In the birth-death
process, it follows that the expected change in the frequency of cooperators of genotype u is close to 0 if pu
is close to 1, hence increases in cooperators who pay nonzero costs are necessarily transient.
3. Discussion
Asymmetric games naturally separate standard evolutionary update rules into cultural and genetic classes.
This distinction is important because it captures biological differences that are not always apparent in models
of evolution based on symmetric games. For example, consider a model player whose offspring replaces a
focal player and a model player whose strategy is imitated by a focal player. For symmetric games, processes
based on these two types of updates are mathematically identical; if asymmetry is present, then the fact
that one update is genetic (replacement) and the other is cultural (imitation) becomes important. Thus,
asymmetric games can highlight fundamental differences in evolutionary processes that are based on distinct
update rules but happen to behave similarly when the underlying game is symmetric.
In order to incorporate into evolutionary games the asymmetries commonly studied in classical game the-
ory, our focus has been on games with asymmetric payoffs. Games with asymmetric payoffs arise naturally
from different forms of interaction heterogeneity. Dependence of payoffs on the environment is a reason-
able assumption when considering ecological variation (Maciejewski and Puleo, 2014). Certain patches may
provide resources or have drawbacks that influence a player’s success when using a particular strategy
(Kun and Dieckmann, 2013). Asymmetric interactions may also be the result of heterogeneity in the sizes or
strengths of players (Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976; Hauser et al., 2014). Whether the source of asymme-
try is the environment or the players themselves, our model effectively resolves a collection of microscopically
asymmetric interactions with a macroscopically symmetric game in the limit of weak selection. Figs. 1 and
2 illustrate this result for three common update rules.
Similar forms of asymmetry have been studied previously in evolutionary game theory: Szolnoki and Szabo´
(2007) consider asymmetry appearing in the update rule that results in “attractive” and “repulsive” players in
the pairwise comparison process. For games with population structures defined by two graphs (“interaction”
and “dispersal” graphs), Ohtsuki et al. (2007a,b) show that the evolution of cooperation can be inhibited by
asymmetry arising from differences in these two graphs. On the other hand, Pacheco et al. (2009) show that
heterogeneous population structures can promote the evolution of cooperation by effectively transforming
a collection of microscopic social dilemmas into a global coordination game. This result is reminiscent
of our Theorem 1, which relates the microscopic interactions to the global behavior of a process. Such
heterogeneous population structures can result in asymmetric interactions even if the underlying game is
symmetric (Maciejewski et al., 2014). These models, although somewhat different from ours, demonstrate
that asymmetry (in its many forms) has a remarkable effect on evolutionary dynamics.
Although genotypic asymmetry can always be reduced to a (larger) symmetric game under genetic update
rules, this symmetric game can be of independent interest. For example, Eq. (16) shows that if cooperators
vary in size or strength, then certain cooperators may increase in the Donation Game even under birth-death
updating. In contrast, cooperation never increases in the absence of cooperator variation Ohtsuki et al.
(2006). Though defectors still eventually outcompete cooperators, the transient increase in cooperators
suggests that other evolutionary processes with this form of asymmetry can behave in novel ways.
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If both ecological and genotypic asymmetries are present, they can be handled separately: genotypic
asymmetry is reduced to either (i) ecological asymmetry (if the update rule is cultural) or (ii) a symmetric
game with more strategies (if the update rule is genetic). In either case, an evolutionary game with both
ecological and genotypic asymmetries can be reduced to a game with ecological asymmetry only and hence
Theorem 1 applies. Our framework handles asymmetry resulting from varying baseline traits due to both
environment and genotype, which could be referred to as phenotypic asymmetry.
The presence of ecological or genotypic asymmetry in an evolutionary process does not necessarily depend
on the selection strength or update rule; these forms of asymmetry may be incorporated into many evolu-
tionary processes. Theorem 1, which effectively reduces a game with ecological asymmetry to a particular
symmetric game, is stated for four common update rules in evolutionary game theory. Fig. 3 demonstrates
(using the asymmetric Snowdrift Game) that this theorem is specific to weak selection. That selection is
weak is often a reasonable assumption when using evolutionary games to study populations of organisms
with many traits. However, our study of the asymmetric Snowdrift Game for stronger selection strengths
suggests that the behavior of asymmetric games is more complicated if selection is strong. Though more
difficult to treat analytically, symmetric games under strong selection are worthy of further investigation.
Asymmetry is omnipresent in nature, and any framework that is used to model evolution should take into
account possible sources of asymmetry. We have formally introduced ecological and genotypic asymmetries
into evolutionary game theory and have studied these asymmetries in the limit of weak selection. Asymmetry
has a natural place in the Donation Game and the Snowdrift Game, but our results are applicable to any
general n-strategy matrix game. Our treatment of asymmetry highlights important differences between
models of cultural and genetic evolution that are not apparent in the traditional setting of symmetric games.
Ecological and genotypic asymmetries cover a wide variety of background variation observed in biological
populations, and, as such, our framework enhances the modeling capacity of evolutionary games.
4. Methods
For the two genetic processes (death-birth and birth-death) and the two cultural processes (imitation
and pairwise comparison) we consider, we treat ecologically asymmetric games on a large, regular network
using pair approximation (Matsuda et al., 1992; Ohtsuki et al., 2006). We assume here that the degree of
the network, k, is at least 3. For k = 2, the network is just a cycle, and we do not treat this case here. The
detailed steps of each calculation are omitted but we include the main setups to allow for reconstruction
of the reported results. We begin by recalling the way in which these four processes are defined (see eg.
Ohtsuki and Nowak (2006)):
(DB) In the death-birth process, a player is selected uniformly at random from the population for death.
A neighbor of the focal individual is then selected to reproduce with probability proportional to
relative fitness, and the resulting offspring replaces the deceased player;
(BD) In the birth-death process, an individual is selected from the population for reproduction with
probability proportional to relative fitness, and the offspring replaces a neighbor at random;
(IM) In the imitation process, an individual is chosen uniformly at random to evaluate his or her strategy.
This focal individual either adopts a strategy of a neighbor (with probability proportional to that
neighbor’s relative fitness) or retains his or her original strategy (with probability proportional to
own relative fitness);
(PC) In the pairwise comparison process, a focal individual is selected uniformly at random from the
population to evaluate his or her strategy. A model individual is then chosen uniformly at random
from the neighbors of the focal individual as a basis for comparison, and the focal player adopts the
strategy of the model player with probability proportional to the model player’s relative fitness.
4.1. Notation and general remarks. Let S = {A1, . . . , An} be the set of pure strategies available to each
player and suppose that there are N players on a regular network of size N (i.e. every node is occupied).
A strategy pair (Ar, As) means a choice of a player using strategy Ar who has as a neighbor a player using
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strategy As. Let
pr := frequency of players using strategy Ar; (17a)
prs := frequency of strategy pairs (Ar, As); (17b)
qs|r := conditional probability of finding an s player next to an r player. (17c)
We will make repeated use of the following properties of these quantities:
n∑
r=1
pr =
n∑
s=1
qs|r = 1; (18a)
psqr|s = prs = psr = prqs|r. (18b)
Strictly speaking, the equalities psqr|s = prs = psr = prqs|r need not hold in general. As a pathological
example, one may consider the network with two nodes and a single undirected link between these nodes.
If the player on the first node uses Ar, the player on the second node uses As, and r 6= s, then prs = 1 but
ps = 1/2, which gives qr|s = 2. However, for large random regular graphs (Bolloba´s, 2001), condition (18b)
holds approximately, and we will take this equality as given in what follows.
For X ∈
{
pr, prs, qs|r
}
16r,s6n
, let E [∆X] denote the expected change in X in one step of the process.
A pair (Ar, i) denotes a player on vertex i using strategy Ar. Given pairs (Ar, i) and (As, j), we denote
by π(As,j) (Ar, i) the expected payoff to a player at vertex j playing strategy As given that they have as a
neighbor an individual playing strategy Ar at vertex i. If β > 0 is a parameter representing the intensity of
selection, then payoff, π, is converted to fitness, fβ (π), via
fβ (π) := exp
{
βπ
}
. (19)
When defined in this way, fitness is always positive.
The main theorem we prove is the following:
Theorem 1. In the limit of weak selection, the dynamics of the ecologically asymmetric death-birth, birth-
death, imitation, and pairwise comparison processes on a large, regular network may be approximated by
the dynamics of a symmetric game with the same update rule and payoff matrix M := 1
kN
∑N
i,j=1 wijM
ij ,
i.e.
M =

A1 A2 · · · An
A1 a11, a11 a12, a21 · · · a1n, an1
A2 a21, a12 a22, a22 · · · a2n, an2
...
...
...
. . .
...
An an1, a1n an2, a2n · · · ann, ann
, (20)
where ast :=
1
kN
∑N
i,j=1 wija
ij
st for each s and t.
Theorem 1 is established for each of these four update rules separately:
4.2. Death-birth updating. If an individual is playing strategy Ar at node i, As at j, and if wij 6= 0, then
π(As,j) (Ar, i) = a
ji
sr +
∑
m 6=i
wjm
n∑
t=1
ajmst qt|s. (21)
Suppose that an (Ar, i) individual is selected for death. The probability that (As, j) replaces this focal
individual is proportional to fβ
(
π(As,j) (Ar, i)
)
. For each i, let (i1, . . . , ik) be an enumeration of the indices
j with wij 6= 0 (say, in increasing order) and let sℓ be the strategy used by the player at vertex iℓ. If (Ar, i)
is chosen for death, then the probability that it is replaced by (Asℓ , iℓ) is
fβ
(
π(Asℓ ,iℓ)
(Ar, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ar, i)
) . (22)
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The Taylor expansion of this term for small β is
fβ
(
π(Asℓ ,iℓ)
(Ar, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ar, i)
) = 1
k
+ β
kπ(As,iℓ) (Ar, i)−
∑k
j=1 π
(
Asij
,ij
) (Ar, i)
k2
+O (β2) . (23)
This expansion will be used frequently in the displays that follow.
4.2.1. Approximation of the expected change in strategy frequencies. Let δx,y be the Kronecker delta (defined
to be 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise). The probability of choosing the player on vertex i for death is 1/N . The
chance that this player is using strategy Ah is ph. Suppose that
(
Asi1 , . . . , Asik
)
is a k-tuple of strategies. If
the focal player at vertex i uses strategy Ah, then the probability that the player on vertex iℓ uses strategy
Asiℓ for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k is qsi1 |h · · · qsik |h. Thus,
E [∆pr] =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∑
h 6=r
ph
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |h · · · qsik |h
k∑
ℓ=1
δsiℓ ,r
 fβ
(
π(Ar ,iℓ) (Ah, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ah, i)
)
( 1N
)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
pr
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |r · · · qsik |r
∑
h 6=r
k∑
ℓ=1
δsiℓ ,h
 fβ
(
π(Ah,iℓ) (Ar, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ar, i)
)
(− 1N
)
(24)
for each strategy, Ar. The Taylor expansion to first-order yields
E [∆pr] ≈ β
(
(k − 1) pr
k2N2
)(
(A)− (B)− (C) + (D)
)
+O
(
β2
)
, (25)
where
(A) =
∑
h 6=r
qh|r
N∑
i=1
k∑
ℓ=1
n∑
siℓ=1
qsiℓ |rπ
(
Asiℓ
,iℓ
) (Ar, i) ; (26a)
(B) =
∑
h 6=r
qh|r
N∑
i=1
k∑
ℓ=1
n∑
siℓ=1
qsiℓ |hπ
(
Asiℓ
,iℓ
) (Ah, i) ; (26b)
(C) =
∑
h 6=r
qh|r
N∑
i=1
k∑
ℓ=1
π(Ah,iℓ) (Ar, i) ; (26c)
(D) =
∑
h 6=r
qh|r
N∑
i=1
k∑
ℓ=1
π(Ar,iℓ) (Ah, i) . (26d)
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4.2.2. Approximation of the expected change in pair frequencies. If r 6= s, then
E [∆prs] =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∑
h 6=r,s
ph
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |h · · · qsik |h
×
k∑
ℓ=1
δsiℓ ,r
 fβ
(
π(Ar ,iℓ) (Ah, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ah, i)
)

(
2
∑k
α=1 δsiα ,s
kN
)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
∑
h 6=r,s
ph
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |h · · · qsik |h
×
k∑
ℓ=1
δsiℓ ,s
 fβ
(
π(As,iℓ) (Ah, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ah, i)
)

(
2
∑k
α=1 δsiα ,r
kN
)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
pr
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |r · · · qsik |r
×
k∑
ℓ=1
δsiℓ ,s
 fβ
(
π(As,iℓ) (Ar, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ar, i)
)

(
2
∑k
α=1
(
δsiα ,r − δsiα ,s
)
kN
)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
pr
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |r · · · qsik |r
×
∑
h 6=r,s
k∑
ℓ=1
δsiℓ ,h
 fβ
(
π(Ah,iℓ) (Ar, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ar, i)
)

(
−
2
∑k
α=1 δsiα ,s
kN
)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
ps
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |s · · · qsik |s
×
k∑
ℓ=1
δsiℓ ,r
 fβ
(
π(Ar ,iℓ) (As, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (As, i)
)

(
2
∑k
α=1
(
δsiα ,s − δsiα ,r
)
kN
)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
ps
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |s · · · qsik |s
×
∑
h 6=r,s
k∑
ℓ=1
δsiℓ ,h
 fβ
(
π(Ah,iℓ) (As, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (As, i)
)

(
−
2
∑k
α=1 δsiα ,r
kN
)
. (27)
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On the other hand,
E [∆prr] =
1
N
n∑
i=1
∑
h 6=r
ph
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |h · · · qsik |h
×
k∑
ℓ=1
δsiℓ ,r
 fβ
(
π(Ar,iℓ) (Ah, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ah, i)
)

(
2
∑k
α=1 δsiα ,r
kN
)
+
1
N
n∑
i=1
pr
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |r · · · qsik |r
×
∑
h 6=r
k∑
ℓ=1
δsiℓ ,h
 fβ
(
π(Ah,iℓ) (Ar, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ar, i)
)

(
−
2
∑k
α=1 δsiα ,r
kN
)
. (28)
The zeroth-order Taylor expansion yields
E [∆prs] ≈
4pr
kN
(
−kqs|r + (k − 1)
n∑
h=1
qs|hqh|r
)
+O (β) (29)
if r 6= s, and
E [∆prr] ≈
2pr
kN
(
1− kqr|r + (k − 1)
k∑
h=1
qr|hqh|r
)
+O (β) . (30)
Therefore, E [∆pr] = O (β) (by Eq. (25)) and E [∆prs] = O (1) (by Eqs. (29) and (30)) for each r and s,
which results in a separation of timescales between the strategy frequencies and the pair frequencies. In
particular, the pair frequencies will reach their equilibrium much more quickly than the strategy frequencies
will, so we can examine the expression for E [∆pr] under the assumption that the pair frequencies have
reached their equilibrium (Ohtsuki et al., 2006).
4.2.3. Weak-selection dynamics. Assuming that each update takes place in one unit of time, we can ap-
proximate the dynamics by the deterministic systems p˙r = E [∆pr] and p˙rs = E [∆prs] for each r and
s (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006). Since β is small, we see that the latter system will
reach equilibrium much quicker than the former. When the pair frequencies have reached equilibrium (i.e.
E [∆prs] = 0), we have
kqs|r = δs,r + (k − 1)
n∑
h=1
qs|hqh|r. (31)
Ohtsuki and Nowak (2006) show that this equation implies that
qr|s = pr +
(
1
k − 1
)
(δs,r − pr) . (32)
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Assuming the system has reached this local equilibrium, we then have
E [∆pr] ≈ β
(
(k − 1) pr
k2N2
)(
(k + 1)
N∑
i,j=1
wij
n∑
s=1
aijrsqs|r
− k
N∑
i,j=1
wij
n∑
s,t=1
aijstqt|sqs|r −
N∑
i,j=1
wij
n∑
s,t=1
aijstqs|tqt|r
)
+O
(
β2
)
= β
(
(k − 1) pr
kN
)(
(k + 1)
n∑
s=1
arsqs|r − k
n∑
s,t=1
astqt|sqs|r −
n∑
s,t=1
astqs|tqt|r
)
+O
(
β2
)
= β
(
(k − 2) pr
k (k − 1)N
)(
− (k − 2) (k + 1)
n∑
s,t=1
astpspt +
(
k2 − k − 1
) n∑
s=1
arsps
−
n∑
s=1
asrps − (k + 1)
n∑
s=1
assps + (k + 1) arr
)
+O
(
β2
)
(33)
as long as β is small. Therefore, if we choose an appropriate time scale and set
p˙r =
E [∆pr]
∆t
; (34a)
brs =
arr + ars − asr − ass
k − 2
; (34b)
φ =
n∑
s,t=1
psptast, (34c)
then p˙r = pr
(∑n
s=1 ps
(
ars + brs
)
− φ
)
, recovering the replicator equation of Ohtsuki and Nowak (2006). It
follows that the dynamics depend on M, proving Theorem 1 for death-birth updating.
4.3. Birth-death updating. In the birth-death process, an individual is selected for reproduction with
probability proportional to relative fitness. The offspring of the selected player then replaces a random
neighbor. Rather than trying to approximate the total fitness of the population, we will simply denote this
value by fpop. Since this value is positive, it does not influence the sign of the expectation values and as
such we will largely ignore it. We have
E [∆pr] =
1
fpop
Npr
(
1
N
) N∑
i=1
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |r · · · qsik |rfβ
(
k∑
ℓ=1
aiiℓrsiℓ
)∑
h 6=r
(∑k
j=1 δsij ,h
k
)(
1
N
)
+
1
fpop
∑
h 6=r
Nph
(
1
N
) N∑
i=1
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |h · · · qsik |hfβ
(
k∑
ℓ=1
aiiℓhsiℓ
)(∑k
j=1 δsij ,r
k
)(
−
1
N
)
. (35)
The local equilibrium conditions for birth-death updating turn out to be the same as those for death-birth
updating (Eq. (32)). These local equilibrium conditions do not take into account selection as long as β is
close to 0, so they are essentially based on a neutral process in which at most one strategy is update at each
time step. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that these conditions are the same for different processes
based on one strategy update in each time step.
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In the following expressions, by x ∝ y we mean that x is proportional to y with positive constant of
proportionality. Letting β → 0 and using the local equilibrium conditions (as well as the same separation-
of-timescales argument we used in §4.2.3), we find that
E [∆pr] ∝ βpr
k N∑
i,j=1
wij
n∑
s=1
aijrsqs|r − (k − 1)
N∑
i,j=1
wij
n∑
s,t=1
aijstqt|sqs|r −
N∑
i,j=1
wij
n∑
s=1
aijsrqs|r
+O (β2)
∝ βpr
(
k
n∑
s=1
arsqs|r − (k − 1)
n∑
s,t=1
astqt|sqs|r −
n∑
s=1
asrqs|r
)
+O
(
β2
)
∝ βpr
(
− (k − 2)
n∑
s,t=1
astpspt + (k − 1)
n∑
s=1
arsps −
n∑
s=1
asrps −
n∑
s=1
assps + arr
)
+O
(
β2
)
. (36)
Just as we saw with the death-birth process, after choosing an appropriate time scale and letting
brs =
(k + 1) arr + ars − asr − (k + 1)ass
(k − 2) (k + 1)
; (37a)
φ =
n∑
s,t=1
psptast, (37b)
we have p˙r = pr
(∑n
s=1 ps
(
ars + brs
)
− φ
)
, proving Theorem 1 for birth-death updating.
4.4. Imitation updating. In the imitation process, an individual is selected uniformly at random from
the population to evaluate his strategy. The chosen player then compares his fitness with the fitness of
each neighbor and either adopts a new strategy or retains his or her current strategy (with probability
proportional to relative fitness). Suppose that an individual at vertex i, playing Ar, is selected to evaluate
his or her strategy. If s 6= r, then the probability that he or she adopts strategy s is
∑k
ℓ=1 δsℓ,sfβ
(
π(Asℓ ,iℓ)
(Ar, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ar, i)
)
+ fβ
(∑k
j=1 a
iij
rsij
) (38)
and the probability that his strategy remains unchanged is
∑k
ℓ=1 δsℓ,rfβ
(
π(Asℓ ,iℓ)
(Ar, i)
)
+ fβ
(∑k
j=1 a
iij
rsij
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ar, i)
)
+ fβ
(∑k
j=1 a
iij
rsij
) . (39)
We let π(As,j) (Ar, i) be the same as it was for death-birth updating. For small β,
fβ
(
π(Asℓ ,iℓ)
(Ar, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ar, i)
)
+ fβ
(∑k
j=1 a
iij
rsij
)
≈
1
k + 1
+ β
 (k + 1)π(Asℓ ,iℓ) (Ar, i)−
∑k
j=1 π
(
Asij
,ij
) (Ar, i)−
∑k
j=1 a
iij
rsij
(k + 1)
2
+O (β2) . (40)
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4.4.1. Approximation of the expected change in strategy frequencies. For r ∈ {1, . . . , n},
E [∆pr] =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∑
h 6=r
ph
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |h · · · qsik |h
×
k∑
ℓ=1
δsiℓ ,r
 fβ
(
π(Ar ,iℓ) (Ah, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ah, i)
)
+ fβ
(∑k
j=1 a
iij
hsij
)
( 1N
)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
pr
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |r · · · qsik |r
×
∑
h 6=r
k∑
ℓ=1
δsiℓ ,h
 fβ
(
π(Ah,iℓ) (Ar, i)
)
∑k
j=1 fβ
(
π(
Asij
,ij
) (Ar, i)
)
+ fβ
(∑k
j=1 a
iij
rsij
)
(− 1N
)
. (41)
The local equilibrium conditions are exactly the same as they were for the death-birth process. Assuming
that the system has reached this local equilibrium, the separation-of-timescales argument we used in §4.2.3
gives
E [∆pr] ≈ β
(
pr
(k + 1)
2
N2
)((
k2 + 2k − 1
) N∑
i,j=1
wij
n∑
s=1
aijrsqs|r
−
(
k2 + k − 2
) N∑
i,j=1
wij
n∑
s,t=1
aijstqt|sqs|r
− (k − 1)
N∑
i,j=1
wij
n∑
s,t=1
aijtsqt|sqs|r − 2
N∑
i,j=1
wij
n∑
s=1
aijsrqs|r
)
+O
(
β2
)
= β
(
kpr
(k + 1)
2
N
)((
k2 + 2k − 1
) n∑
s=1
arsqs|r −
(
k2 + k − 2
) n∑
s,t=1
astqt|sqs|r
− (k − 1)
n∑
s,t=1
atsqt|sqs|r − 2
n∑
s=1
asrqs|r
)
+O
(
β2
)
= β
(
k (k − 2) pr
(k − 1) (k + 1)2N
)(
− (k − 2) (k + 3)
n∑
s,t=1
astpspt +
(
k2 + k − 3
) n∑
s=1
arsps
− 3
n∑
s=1
asrps − (k + 3)
n∑
s=1
assps + (k + 3) arr
)
+O
(
β2
)
. (42)
With brs =
(k+3)arr+3ars−3asr−(k+3)ass
(k−2)(k+3) and φ =
∑n
s,t=1 psptast, we have
p˙r = pr
(
n∑
s=1
ps
(
ars + brs
)
− φ
)
, (43)
which establishes Theorem 1 for imitation updating.
4.5. Pairwise comparison updating. In the pairwise comparison process, a focal individual is selected
uniformly at random from the population. A model individual is then chosen uniformly at random from
the neighbors of the focal individual. If πf and πm denote the payoffs to the focal and model individuals,
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respectively, then the focal player will adopt the strategy of the model player with probability
1
1 + eβ(πf−πm)
=
fβ (πm)
fβ (πm) + fβ (πf)
, (44)
where β > 0 is a real parameter representing the intensity of selection. In addition to the expected payoff
π(As,j) (Ar, i) (defined in the same way as for death-birth updating), we let
π(As,i) :=
k∑
j=1
aiijssij
(45)
if (As, i) has as a neighborhood
(
Asi1 , . . . , Asik
)
. With this notation in place, we have
E [∆pr] =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∑
h 6=r
ph
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |h · · · qsik |h
×
k∑
ℓ=1
(
1
k
)
δsiℓ ,r
(
fβ
(
π(Ar,iℓ) (Ah, i)
)
fβ
(
π(Ar ,iℓ) (Ah, i)
)
+ fβ
(
π(Ah,i)
))( 1
N
)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
pr
n∑
si1 ,...,sik=1
qsi1 |r · · · qsik |r
×
∑
h 6=r
k∑
ℓ=1
(
1
k
)
δsiℓ ,h
(
fβ
(
π(Ah,iℓ) (Ar, i)
)
fβ
(
π(Ah,iℓ) (Ar , i)
)
+ fβ
(
π(Ar ,i)
))(− 1
N
)
. (46)
As β → 0, we have
fβ (x)
fβ (x) + fβ (y)
≈
1
2
+ β
(
x− y
4
)
+O
(
β2
)
. (47)
Consequently, in the limit of weak selection,
E [∆pr] ≈ β
pr
2kN2
k N∑
i,j=1
wij
n∑
s=1
aijrsqs|r − (k − 1)
N∑
i,j=1
wij
n∑
s,t=1
aijstqt|sqs|r −
N∑
i,j=1
wij
n∑
s=1
aijsrqs|r
+O (β2)
= β
pr
2N
(
k
n∑
s=1
arsqs|r − (k − 1)
n∑
s,t=1
astqt|sqs|r −
n∑
s=1
asrqs|r
)
+O
(
β2
)
= β
(
(k − 2) pr
2 (k − 1)N
)(
− (k − 2)
n∑
s,t=1
astpspt + (k − 1)
n∑
s=1
arsps
−
n∑
s=1
asrps −
n∑
s=1
assps + arr
)
+O
(
β2
)
. (48)
The local equilibrium conditions are exactly the same as they were for the other processes, but in this
case they are not needed to arrive at this last expression for E [∆pr]. With brs =
arr+ars−asr−ass
k−2 and
φ =
∑n
s,t=1 psptast, we have p˙r = pr
(∑n
s=1 ps
(
ars + brs
)
− φ
)
. It follows that the dynamics of the pairwise
comparison process depend on M, which completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Finally, we show that the dynamics of each process are independent of the particular network configuration
if the asymmetric game is spatially additive:
Definition 1. If aijrs = x
i
rs + y
j
rs for each r and s, then M
ij is called a spatially additive payoff matrix. If
Mij is spatially additive for each i and j, then the game is said to be spatially additive.
Corollary 1. If Mij is spatially additive for each i and j, then the expected change in the frequency of
strategy Ar, E [∆pr], is independent of (wij)16i,j6N for each r. In particular, the dynamics of the process
do not depend on the particular network configuration.
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Proof. If aijrs = x
i
rs + y
j
rs for each r, s, i, j, then
ast =
1
kN
N∑
i,j=1
wija
ij
st =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xirs +
1
N
N∑
j=1
yjrs, (49)
which is independent of (wij)16i,j6N . The corollary then follows directly from Theorem 1. 
4.6. Computer simulations. In each simulation, a random k-regular network (with k = 3) of N = 500
vertices is generated. The selection intensity is β = 0.01 for Figs. 1 and 2, β = 0.1 for Fig. 3(A), and β = 0.5
for Fig. 3(B). The figures are generated based on data collected from a number of cycles: In each cycle, the
network is given an initial configuration of cooperators by first choosing a density, d, uniformly at random
from the interval [0, 1], and then placing a cooperator (resp. defector) at each vertex with probability d
(resp. 1 − d). The update rule is applied until either C or D fixates. (The absorption time depends on a
number of factors including the game, selection strength, and initial configuration of the population.) Let
pC (t) denote the frequency of cooperators at time t; pC (0) is just the initial frequency of cooperators. The
frequency pC (t+ 1) is obtained from pC (t) by adding to it the change in the frequency of cooperators over
the next N (= 500) updates. For each t, the quantity pC (t+ 1) − pC (t) is associated with pC (t). Once
pC ∈ {0, 1}, a new initial configuration of cooperators is chosen and the process is repeated. After each
possible value of pC has at least 10
5 associated data points (changes in cooperator frequency), these changes
are averaged, and this resulting quantity, ∆pC , is paired with the corresponding value of pC . These pairs
are then plotted to obtain Figs. 1, 2, and 3. The results from pair approximation apply to the expected
change over one update, but we can easily get a predicted result over N updates (i.e. one Monte Carlo step)
by scaling the expressions for E [∆pC ] by a factor of N .
Small deviations from the expected results are seen in each of the figures, and these deviations are due
to the effects of finite selection parameter (β) and the finiteness of the set of possible values of pC (∆pC is
a multiple of 1/N). As an example of how these properties can give rise to small deviations, consider the
Donation Game under imitation updating in Fig. 1(A). Eq. (42) predicts that E [∆pC ] is always positive,
yet we observe in Fig. 1(A) that this change becomes negative as pC → 0, 1. If pC = (N − 1) /N and β > 0,
then the only defector in the population has a higher payoff than all of the other cooperators. Let f
(j)
β denote
the fitness of the player at location j. Thus, with just a single defector (at location i) in a population of
cooperators, we have f
(i)
β > f
(j)
β for each j 6= i, with equality if and only if β = 0. The expected change in
the frequency of cooperators in the next time step is
E [∆pC ] =
(
1
N
)(
1
N
)1− f (i)β
f
(i)
β +
∑
{j : wij=1}
f
(j)
β

−
(
1
N
) ∑
{j : wij=1}
(
1
N
) f (i)β
f
(j)
β +
∑
{l : wjl=1}
f
(l)
β
 . (50)
The first (resp. second) summation runs over all of the neighbors of i (resp. j). For each j 6= i,
f
(i)
β
f
(i)
β +
∑
{j : wij=1}
f
(j)
β
>
1
k + 1
; (51a)
f
(i)
β
f
(j)
β +
∑
{l : wjl=1}
f
(l)
β
>
1
k + 1
, (51b)
both with equality if and only if β = 0. Therefore, we see that
E [∆pC ] 6
(
1
N
)(
1
N
)(
1−
1
k + 1
)
−
(
1
N
)(
k
N
)(
1
k + 1
)
= 0 (52)
with equality if and only if β = 0. The same argument explains the negative average changes as pC → 0.
Since pC can only take on finitely many values for a given population size, similar arguments explain the
small discrepancies between the actual and expected results for intermediate values of pC (see Fig. 1).
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